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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                   
No. 05-2397
                    
JULIAN BASTIAN LUNTUNGAN,
                                      Petitioner
   v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES;
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; 
MICHAEL ANDERSON, 
as Acting Director of the Newark, New Jersey
Field Office of the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
                    
Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A96-266-204)
                     
2Argued April 3, 2006
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and BECKER*, Circuit Judges.
(Filed June 5, 2006 )
                    
LAWRENCE SPIVAK     (ARGUED)
150 Broadway, Sutie 1400
New York, NY 10038
    Attorney for Petitioner
LINDA S. WERNERY
JANICE K. REDFERN      (ARGUED)
WILLIAM C. PEACHEY
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
     Attorneys for Respondents
                                  
      *This case was argued before the panel of Judges Rendell,
Smith and Becker.  Judge Becker died on May 19, 2006, before
the filing of the Opinion.  The decision is filed by a quorum of
the panel.  28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
3                 
OPINION OF THE COURT
                 
PER CURIAM.
Julian Bastian Luntungan, a native and citizen of
Indonesia and the petitioner in this case, failed to attend two
consecutive removal hearings, and an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
ordered him removed in absentia.  Luntungan then filed three
consecutive motions to reopen, which the IJ denied, and
Luntungan appealed the denial of the third motion to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  Reviewing the denial of the
third motion, the BIA agreed with the IJ that Luntungan was
permitted to file only one motion to reopen.  This conclusion, of
course, required the denial of his third motion.
Addressing Luntungan’s petition for review, we first
conclude that under the plain language of both the Immigration
and Nationality Act and a BIA regulation, an alien ordered
removed in absentia may file only one motion to reopen.  See 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).  We then
consider Luntungan’s contention that we should read an
exception into the one motion rule because his attorney was
ineffective in preparing the first motion to reopen.  Other courts
have referred to exceptions to the one motion rule as a form of
See, e.g., Iturribarria v. I.N.S., 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.1
2003).  We note, however, that the term may not be entirely
accurate, for tolling, by definition, applies to time limits, not
numerical limits.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1525 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining “toll” as “(Of a time period, esp. a statutory one) to stop
the running of; to abate <toll the limitations period>”).
4
equitable tolling.   We leave open the possibility that some1
equitable principle would, in the proper circumstances, permit
an alien to file more than one motion to reopen, but whatever its
bounds, equitable tolling will not aid Luntungan.  Even
assuming that the alleged ineffectiveness of Luntungan’s first
attorney deprived him of a fair chance to be heard on his first
motion to reopen, the IJ denied Luntungan’s second motion for
reasons unrelated to the one motion rule, and  Luntungan does
not claim that the attorney who filed the second motion rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Thus, even assuming that
Luntungan’s first motion to reopen did not provide a fair chance
to be heard, any procedural unfairness was remedied when the
IJ considered the second motion.  We therefore deny
Luntungan’s petition for review.
I.  Facts
Luntungan was admitted to the United States in June
1995, with permission to remain until December 15, 1995.  In
April of 2003, Luntungan applied for asylum.  He asserted that
his house had been burned down, and that he feared persecution
in Indonesia because he is a practicing Christian and ethnically
Chinese.  The former Immigration and Naturalization Service
The statute provides:2
Consequences of failure to appear
5
then served Luntungan with a Notice to Appear, charging him
with removability on the ground that he remained in the United
States longer than his visa permitted.  The Notice to Appear
stated that Luntungan’s removal hearing would occur in New
York, New York on May 6, 2003, but the New York
Immigration Court later granted Luntungan’s motion for a
change of venue to New Jersey. 
 Luntungan’s attorney then received a Notice of Hearing
from the Immigration Court in Newark, New Jersey.  The Notice
of Hearing stated that if Luntungan failed to appear on
December 9, 2003, an order of removal could be entered against
him.  On September 2, 2003, the Newark Immigration Court
sent Luntungan’s attorney a second Notice of Hearing, which
moved the date of the hearing forward to September 19, 2003.
On September 22, 2003, the Newark Immigration Court sent
another Notice of Hearing to Luntungan’s attorney, changing the
hearing date to October 28, 2003.
Luntungan failed to appear for the October 28, 2003
hearing, and the IJ  rescheduled the hearing for November 4,
2003.  Luntungan again failed to appear on November 4.
Therefore, the IJ ordered Luntungan removed under §
240(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A), which authorizes in
absentia removal orders.   2
(A) In general
Any alien who, after written notice . . . has been
provided to the alien or the alien’s counsel of record,
does not attend a proceeding under this section, shall
be ordered removed in absentia if the Service
establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence that the written notice was so provided and
that the alien is removable. . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A).
In his reply brief, Luntungan states that he is “not seeking3
this Court’s review of the two initial motions to reopen.”
6
Luntungan responded by filing a series of motions to
reopen.  We emphasize that Luntungan asks us to review only
the denial of his third motion.3
First Motion To Reopen.  Luntungan first moved to
reopen proceedings on January 20, 2004.  In an affidavit
attached to the motion, Luntungan implied that his attorney had
written him a letter informing him of the rescheduled hearing.
However, he stated that he did not receive any such letter.
Luntungan did not allege at this stage that his attorney was
ineffective in failing to notify him of the rescheduled hearing;
indeed, the same attorney continued to represent him.  The IJ
denied the motion, stating that Luntungan’s attorney was
properly notified of the rescheduled hearing and that Luntungan
did not allege that his attorney provided ineffective assistance.
We have explained that to comply with Lozada, a motion4
to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel must meet
7
Second Motion To Reopen.  On March 5, 2004,
Luntungan, represented by new counsel, filed a second motion
to reopen.  Luntungan now asserted that he missed his hearing
dates due to the ineffective assistance of his former attorney.  In
a new affidavit, Luntungan stated that he did not learn about the
date changes until he visited his former attorney’s office prior to
the original hearing date, but after he had missed the two
rescheduled hearings.
Luntungan also asserted that his attorney was ineffective
in preparing his first motion to reopen.  He stated that the
affidavit accompanying his first motion had not been translated
to him, despite his inability to read English.  He claimed that if
he had understood his affidavit, he would not have
acknowledged that his former attorney attempted to
communicate the date changes to him.
On the same day that he filed the second motion to
reopen, Luntungan lodged a disciplinary complaint against his
former attorney with the appropriate ethics committee.
However, the complaint was not attached to the motion to
reopen. 
The IJ denied Luntungan’s second motion to reopen,
stating that his ineffective assistance claim did not meet the
requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I.&N. Dec. 637 (BIA
1988).   First, Luntungan failed to provide evidence that his4
three requirements: 
(1) the alien’s motion must be supported by an
“affidavit of the allegedly aggrieved [alien] attesting
to the relevant facts”; (2) “former counsel must be
informed of the allegations and allowed the
opportunity to respond,” and this response should be
submitted with the motion; and (3) “if it is asserted
that prior counsel’s handling of the case involved a
violation of ethical or legal responsibilities, the
motion should reflect whether a complaint has been
filed with appropriate disciplinary authorities
regarding such representation, and if not, why not.”
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 106 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Lozada,
19 I.&N. Dec. at 639).
8
former attorney was informed of the ineffective assistance
allegations and given an opportunity to respond.  Second,
Luntungan neither provided evidence that he filed a formal
disciplinary complaint nor explained his failure to do so. 
Third Motion To Reopen.  On May 12, 2004, Luntungan
filed a third motion to reopen.  This time, he sought to comply
with the Lozada requirements by attaching both the complaint
lodged against his former attorney and an affidavit from his new
attorney, which chronicled discussion between the new attorney
and the former attorney about the disciplinary complaint.
It is not clear why the IJ denied the second motion to5
reopen on the basis of Lozada, rather than applying the one motion
rule.
9
The IJ denied the motion, concluding that under the
relevant regulations, Luntungan was entitled to file only one
motion to reopen.   Luntungan appealed the denial of the third5
motion to the BIA, which issued a one paragraph opinion
affirming the IJ’s decision.  Luntungan now petitions for review
of the denial of his third motion to reopen.
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction to review the denial of Luntungan’s
third motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which provides
for judicial review of final orders of removal.  Ordinarily, the
denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Caushi v. Attorney General, 436 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2006).
This case, however, turns entirely on questions of law.  “We
review the BIA’s legal decisions de novo, but will afford
Chevron deference to the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of
statutes which it is charged with administering.”  Kamara v.
Attorney General, 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).
III.  Analysis 
A.
Section 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
Subparagraph (C)(iv), which bears the heading “Special6
rule for battered spouses, children, and parents,” does not apply
here.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv).
Ordinarily, an alien must file a motion to reopen within 907
days of the entry of a final order of removal.  8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(C)(I).  However, a different time period applies to an
alien who, like Luntungan, is ordered removed in absentia.  Such
an alien may file a motion to reopen within 180 days of an order of
removal “if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was
because of exceptional circumstances” or “at any time” if the alien
demonstrates that he did not receive required notice of the
proceedings.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(I) & (ii).  While these
provisions create specialized rules for the time period during which
a motion to reopen may be filed by an alien ordered removed in
10
(INA), which governs removal proceedings, states that an alien
who is ordered removed may file only one motion to reopen:
Motions to reopen
(A) In general
An alien may file one motion to reopen
proceedings under this section, except that this
limitation shall not apply so as to prevent the
filing of one motion to reopen described in
subparagraph (C)(iv).6
  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).7
absentia, they do not refer to the number of motions that such an
alien may file.  Rather, the general provision governing motions to
reopen, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), applies, permitting only one
motion to reopen.
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (stating that in removal8
proceedings, “[a]n immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for
11
BIA regulations confirm that an alien ordered removed
in absentia may file only one motion to reopen:
Order entered in absentia or removal proceedings.
An order of removal entered in absentia or in
removal proceedings pursuant to section
240(b)(5) of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)] may
be rescinded only upon a motion to reopen . . . .
An alien may file only one motion pursuant to this
paragraph.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (emphasis added).
Separate statutes and regulations apply to an alien who is
ordered deported or excluded—as opposed to removed—in
absentia.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[r]emoval is a
new procedure,” created by the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).  Jama v.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 349
(2005).  As a result of IIRIRA, removal proceedings combine
“two previously distinct expulsion proceedings, ‘deportation’
and ‘exclusion.’”  Id.   An alien who would have been placed in8
deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”).
 See also Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973 (9th9
Cir. 2004) (stating that no due process violation occurs where a
petitioner would have been placed in deportation proceedings pre-
IIRIRA, but is placed in removal proceedings post-IIRIRA).
See Lopez v. I.N.S., 184 F.3d 1097, 1099 n.2 (9th Cir.10
1999) (“[Section] 1252b was repealed by IIRIRA, whose rules do
not apply to aliens . . . who were in exclusion or deportation
proceedings as of April 1, 1997.”) (citations omitted); Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-625 (stating that IIRIRA’s
amendments to the INA do not apply to aliens in deportation
proceedings prior to the effective date of IIRIRA).
12
deportation or exclusion proceedings prior to April 1, 1997, is
now placed in removal proceedings.  Galicki v. INS, No. 02-cv-
4586, 2003 WL 21781946 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2003), at *2.  9
Under the statute that applies to pre-IIRIRA proceedings,
8 U.S.C. § 1252b, there is no limit on the number of motions to
reopen that an alien may file.  Indeed, the statute does not
mention motions to reopen.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (repealed
1996).  The old statute continues to apply to aliens who were
placed in proceedings before April 1, 1997, the effective date of
IIRIRA.    10
The BIA has also promulgated regulations that apply to
aliens placed in proceedings before April 1, 1997.  Under these
regulations, an alien who is ordered deported in absentia may
Title 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(D) provides:11
The time and numerical limitations set forth in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall not apply to a
motion to reopen filed pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph (b)(4)(iii)(A) of this section.
Paragraph (b)(1) permits only one motion to reopen, and paragraph
(b)(4)(iii)(A) refers to motions to reopen following an “order
entered in absentia in deportation proceedings.”  Thus, under §
1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(D), the numerical limit on motions to reopen
does not apply to in absentia deportation orders.    
Luntungan concedes as much in his reply brief.  12
See Joshi v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating13
that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) deals with removal proceedings
as distinguished from deportation proceedings and provides that
“only one motion to reopen a removal proceeding may be filed”);
Akwada v. Ashcroft, No. 02-2078, 2004 WL 2538212, at *4 n.5
(4th Cir. Nov. 10, 2004) (“There is no number limit on a motion to
reopen to rescind an order entered in absentia in deportation or
exclusion proceedings if an alien does not receive statutorily
prescribed notice.  Akwada, however, was subject to removal
13
file an unlimited number of motions to reopen.   However,11
these regulations do not apply to an alien, such as Luntungan,
who is placed in proceedings after April 1, 1997.   An alien12
such as Luntungan is subject to the one motion rule laid out in
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).   13
proceedings, to which stricter limits apply.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§
1003.23(b)(4)(ii) & (iii)(D)); Fajardo v. I.N.S.,  300 F.3d 1018,
1020 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing the regulations governing in
absentia removal orders from those governing in absentia
deportation orders).
The footnote, which appeared in the section of the Borges14
opinion devoted to facts and procedural history, was designed only
to explain why the IJ allowed a second motion to reopen.  See 402
F.3d at 402 n.5.  
14
In Borges v. Gonzales, we stated in a footnote, “[w]hen
an order of removal is issued in absentia . . . the regulations are
more lenient and it appears that multiple motions to reopen may
be filed by the alien.”  402 F.3d 398, 402 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005)
(emphasis added) (citing Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 25 (1st
Cir. 2001); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(D)).  As the foregoing
discussion demonstrates, this statement is questionable: An alien
may not file multiple motions to reopen an in absentia order of
removal, as distinguished from an in absentia order of
deportation.  Moreover, the Borges footnote is dicta, and it
addresses an issue not central to the holding in that case.14
Declining to follow the Borges footnote, we hold that under 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), an alien
ordered removed in absentia may file only one motion to reopen.
B.
Luntungan argues that although the INA permits but one
motion to reopen, the numerical limit should be equitably
The Ninth Circuit “recognizes equitable tolling of15
deadlines and numerical limits on motions to reopen or reconsider
during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because
of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due
15
“tolled,” allowing him to file multiple motions to reopen.
Strictly defined, equitable tolling is “[t]he doctrine that the
statute of limitations will not bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite
diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the
limitations period had expired.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 579
(8th ed. 2004).  Equitable tolling of statutes of limitations has a
venerable history.  See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,
397 (1946) (stating that in cases of fraud, equitable tolling “is
read into every federal statute of limitation”); Borges, 402 F.3d
at 406 (discussing the “old chancery rule” that a statute of
limitations will be tolled for fraud).  
In recent cases, we have applied equitable tolling to the
time periods during which an alien may file a motion to reopen.
As discussed above, see supra note 7, an alien ordered removed
in absentia has 180 days to file a motion to reopen arguing that
he failed to appear due to exceptional circumstances.  See 8
U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C)(I).  We have held that this time period is
subject to equitable tolling.  See Borges, 402 F.3d at 406;
Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 249 (3d Cir. 2005). 
We have not issued a precedential opinion deciding
whether numerical limits on motions to reopen may be equitably
tolled, and  we note that other circuits have stated different
views on the issue.   Even assuming, arguendo, that the one15
diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error.”
Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted); see also Varela v. INS, 204 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir.
2000); Davies v. INS, No. 00-1773, 2001 WL 608982 (4th Cir.
June 5, 2001) (allowing equitable tolling).  The Sixth Circuit,
however, seems doubtful that the numerical limit may be equitably
tolled and has “never held that equitable tolling applies to
numerical limitations on motions to reopen.”  Sene v. Gonzales,
No. 04-3794, 2006 WL 994173, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 14, 2006).
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motion limit is subject to equitable tolling, we hold that
equitable tolling does not apply here. 
Luntungan alleges that his first counsel, who filed the
first motion to reopen, was ineffective.  Under the doctrine of
equitable tolling, Luntungan might be entitled to file a second
motion.  But in effect, Luntungan already received this form of
relief:  Luntungan’s new counsel filed a second motion to
reopen, which the IJ rejected because Luntungan failed to
comply with the Lozada requirements.  Only when Luntungan
filed his third motion did the IJ deny it as numerically barred. 
To demonstrate that the IJ erred in denying his third
motion to reopen as numerically barred, Luntungan must show
that equitable considerations should permit him to file the third
motion. This showing would have to be based on unfairness
surrounding the second motion to reopen.  After all, if the
second motion gave Luntungan a fair chance to be heard, there
is no equitable reason to permit a third motion.  
Because we conclude that the one motion rule disposes of16
this case, we do not reach Luntungan’s argument that he is also
entitled to equitable tolling of the 180-day window in which an
alien ordered removed in absentia must file a motion to reopen.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(I).
17
Luntungan does not allege that the attorney who filed the
second motion defrauded him or otherwise provided ineffective
assistance.  Consequently, we conclude that the second motion
gave Luntungan a fair chance to be heard.  Equity requires
nothing more, and we deny the petition for review.16
